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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARREN J. POLLICK, by and 
through his Guardian ad Litem, 
John R. Pollick, and JOHN R. 
POLLICK. Plaint i ff's-ll cspond en ts, 
vs . 




Respondents' Petition for Rehearing and 
Brief in Support Thereof 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW plaintiffs and respondents herein 
and respectfully petition this Honorable Court for a 
rehearing in the above-entitled case and, for an order 
vacating this Honorable Court's decision and reinstat-




This Court has assumed the jury's prerogative of 
weighing evidence an<l resolving issues of fact. 
POINT II 
This Court has deprived plaintiffs of their consti-
tutional and statutory right of a trial by jury. 
RA\YLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Robert D. Moore 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
INTRODUCTION 
The defendant, in its brief of appellant, presented 
issues which it requested this Court to review. Plaintiffs 
met said issues in the traditional manner, confident that 
the case would be determined one way or another, on 
the basis of the issues presently in the briefs. The ma-
jority opinion, however, is based on a purely collateral 
issue. 
It is a position of plaintiffs that if the case is to be 
based on a collateral issue not raised in the briefs, at the 
least, a rehearing should be granted in order that plain-
tiffs may be afforded a full opportunity to meet all of 
the issues, including the new ones upon which the ma-
jority of this Court has based its opinion. 
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POINT I. 
THIS COURT HAS ASSUMED THE JEHY'S 
PHEHOGATIVE OF \VEIGHING EVIDENCE 
_\:\ D HESOLYING ISSUES OF FACT. 
The plaintiff, Darren J. Pollick, age 3, accompan-
ied his father to defendant's store in Murray for the 
purpose of making a purchase. \Vhile the boy was in the 
store, he was injured when he stepped up on the mop-
board of a bannister approximately 38 inches and 
toppled over same falling to the basement below. The 
mopboard was inches in heighth and surrounded the 
base of the bannister. 
Plaintiffs instituted this action to recover damages 
for the injuries sustained by the boy on the theory that 
defendant, as a storeowner, had the legal duty to main-
tain the store in a reasonably safe condition for business 
imitees. That the defendant breached this duty because 
the bannister and mopboard combination was not rea-
sonably safe in view of expected occupancy of the store 
by children of tender years and exposed them to an un-
reasonable risk of harm. 
The testimony clearly revealed that defendant so-
licited parents to bring their children with them to the 
store and knew that said children would be near the 
bannister oYer which plaintiff fell. The testimony also 
established that the mopboard could haYe been easily 
and inexpensively removed or that the top railing of the 
bannister could haYe been raised and thus ham mini-
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mized the likelihood of children falling over the ban-
nister. It thus appeared obvious to both the trial court 
and the trial jury that just a little bit of precaution and 
foresight on the part of the defendant, who clearly owed 
a duty to exercise such precaution would probably ha\·e 
preYented the child's injury. The manager admitted as 
much in his testimony on cross-examination. 
Defendant urged that because the bannister was 
constructed in substantial compliance with the building 
code it could not be considered unsafe. But it has never 
been the law that unnamed administrative employees, by 
scrivening codes of this sort, can deny to citizens sub-
stantial common law rights which spring up from funda-
mental duty of a corporate entity inviting the public to 
attend its place of business, with profit as its motive, to 
make said place reasonably safe for anticipated use. 
The Honorable Court has ruled as a matter of law 
that reasonable minds could not differ on the question 
of defendant's negligence even though both the trial 
judge and the eight-man jury felt otherwise. \Ve re-
spectfully submit that this decision is in direct opposition 
to this Court's prior decision in the case of Brent 
Wheeler etc. vs. Dennis D. Jones, et al, 19 Utah 2d 392, 
.J.31 P.:M 985 (1967). In the Wheeler case a 12-year old 
child was an invitee to a swimming pool operated by de-
fendants. Upon leaving the pool area, the minor walked 
into a glass panel door and sustained injuries. Plaintiff 
claimed defendants were negligent for failing to warn 
of the presence of the door and failing to have safety 
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b'lass iu the door. The jury found defendants uegligent 
for maintaining a door with glass insufficient to with-
,laiHl unlinary bumping and awarded plaintiff damages. 
The defendants appealed and this Court affirmed the 
jury verdict stating: 
"Negligence is the breach of a duty to use due 
care under the circumstances of the situation. 
"rhen children are involved, the dutv to look out 
for their safety is increased, and faiiure to make 
a given discovery might be negligence when chil-
dren are involved and not negligence if adults 
only are affected. It is a relative thing and gen-
erally must be left to the jury to say if under all 
the cricumstances the conduct of the actor meas-
ures up to the standards of a reasonably prudent 
man.*** 
All the world must know the tendency of chil-
drrn to play rough and not to have the judgment 
and maturity of adults." 
ln analyzing the evidence to determine if a jury 
l}Uestion was presented, the Court explained: 
"The serious cuts sustained by the plaintiff are 
mute evidence of the dangers inherent in the type 
of door used, and we think it was a jury question 
as to whether the dangers should have been recog-
nized and corrected. The claim of error in allow-
ing the expert witness to express an opinion 
the glass door was dangerous could not be pr.eJU-
dicial when the jury saw the result of a colhs10n 
between the minor plaintiff and that very door. 
There could be no question but that the door was 
dan•»erous and a menace to those children who 
b • ,, 
were playing near 1t. 
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This Honorable Court then concluded the opinion 
by stating: 
"\Ve believe that the defendants had their dav in 
court, and an impartial jury has said that their 
conduct in leaving a dangerous type of glass in a 
partly closed door was an act which did not meas-
ure up to the standards of due care under the cir-
cumstances in the case." 
The majority opinion states: "But except for the 
fact that this accident occurred, there is no evidence that 
those or any other aspects of the bannister or the mop-
board were in any way at variance with the ordinary 
construction of such a protective guardrail or bannister;" 
It is true that there is no evidence as to "ordinary con-
struction" of similar guardrails. But, as was said by 
Justice Holmes in and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Be-
hymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905, 
"\Vhat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to 
be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard 
of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied 
with or not." Certainly, the factual question of what is 
or is not "ordinary construction" should not be decisive 
on the issue of whether ordinary minds may differ as to 
whether or not the low bannister and mopboard con-
structed in an area frequented by small children con-
stituted ordinary care, especially when it would have 
taken such a little amount of effort to eliminate the 
danger. 
"\Ve respectfully submit that this Honorable Court 
should grant a rehearing in order that the Wheeler case, 
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and the case at bar may be reanalyzed. It appears 
that one or the other of said cases should be the law of 
Ctah, but both. The two cases are diametrically op-
vlsed te one another on both theory and principle. Of 
it is our belief that 1Vheeler should prevail. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT HAS DEPRIVED PLAIN-
TIFFS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY RIGHT OF A TRIAL BY JURY. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Honorable 
Court by overturning the jury verdict has taken over the 
function of the jury and denied plaintiffs their right to 
a jury trial. The right of plaintiffs to have a jury decide 
their case should have flowed in a natural easy way from 
the likelihood of harm to children from this little, low-
built bannister . 
.An outstanding and often cited case that prescribes 
guide lines in determining whether given fact situations 
raise jury questions is Brown vs. Salt Lake City, 33 
Ctah 222, 93 P.2d 570 (1908), where the Court stated: 
"''re have no hesitancy in saying that, if the facts 
were for us to pass upon, we should be forced to 
arrive at a conclusion different from that reached 
by the jury; for it would be quite difficult for us 
to see how the officers of the city as reasonably 
prudent men, should have foreseen that boys 
would go down a dark passage way of over six 
hundred feet in length, nearly four hundred feet 
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of which was totally dark, and play therein, and 
that although they did so, they would go or fall 
into the water coming into the conduit from the 
Jordan Canal. And if childish instincts induced 
them to resort to the conduit to play "jail" or 
otherwise, one would naturally assume that they 
would instinctively avoid going into the dark 
passage way to the length of nearly two ordinary 
city blocks. In the statement herein made that, 
were we permitted to pass on the facts and deter-
mine the question, not as matter of law but of 
fact, we would arrive at a conclusion different 
from that found by the jury, the Chief Justice 
authorizes us to say that he is not prepared to 
say that, if he were a trier of the fact, he would 
find in favor of the defendant on the question of 
negligence (upon this question he expresses no 
opinion); but that he is, however, clearly of the 
opinion that the facts amply justified the court in 
submitting the question of negligence to the 
jury." 
The leading modern Utah case on the right of trial 
by jury is Stickle v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 122 Utah 
477, 251 P.2d 867, where this Court stated: 
"In our democratic system, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is derived; 
from its initiation and creation to its final appli-
cation and enforcement, the law is the expression 
of their will. The functioning of a cross-section 
of the citizenry as a jury is the method by which 
the people express this in. the apylic.ation of 
law to controversies which arise under 1t. Both 
our constitutional and statutory provisions assure 
trial by jury to citizens of this state. 
Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate 
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by 
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presuming to determine questions of fact which 
litigants have a right to have passed upon by 
juries. Part of the merit of the jury system is its 
safeguarding against such arbitrary power in the 
courts. To the great credit of the courts of t}1's 
country, they have been extremely reluctant to 
infringe upon this right, and by leaving it unim-
paired have kept the administration of justice 
close to the people. Of course, the rights of liti-
gants should not be surrendered to the arbitrary 
will of juries without regard to whether there is 
a violation of legal rights as a basis for recovery. 
The court does have a duty and a responsibility of 
supervisory control over the action of juries which 
is just as essential to the proper administration of 
justice as the function of the jury itself. Never-
theless, we remain cognizant of the vital impor-
tance of the privilege of trial by jury in our sys-
tem of justice and deem it our duty to zealously 
protect and preserve it. 
CONCLUSION 
It is our position that this Honorable Court's ma-
jority decision has for the first time, brought clearly into 
focus the question of whether the Plaintiffs have been 
deprived of their right to a jury trial. This question is of 
overriding importance, not only to the Plaintiffs but to 
the bench and bar generally. 'Ve would like to have it 
reviewed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard C. Dibblee 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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